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Abstract 
This experiment examines people’s ability to invent creative 
outcomes to simple event sequences. We report a study where 
participants are given everyday event descriptions and asked 
to describe either a predictable outcome (Predictable group) 
or a creative outcome (Creative group). Following the 
Creative Cognition approach (Finke, Ward & Smith, 1992), 
we expected that though those instructed to be creative might 
generate novel and interesting outcomes, they would also be 
bound by their knowledge of the outcomes that typically 
occur. The results support this prediction, in that while the 
Creative group manifested more inventive variability in their 
outcomes relative to the Predictable group, their proposed 
outcomes still overlapped in part with those of the Predictable 
group. These results show that although creativity may take 
people beyond their knowledge, they can never fully break 
free from that knowledge. 
Introduction 
Creativity is like reaching for the stars with your feet firmly 
stuck in the mud of everyday life. While the creative act 
takes us beyond what an individual or a society has thought 
before, it seems to be inextricably constrained by what is 
known already (see e.g., Boden, 1995; Finke, Ward & 
Smith, 1992; Perkins, 1981; Sternberg, 1999). In science, 
new theories come from reactions to old paradigms, but still 
work from the same methodologies and findings of previous 
decades. In the arts, similar reactions to the conventions of a 
previous age occur, though often themes and materials 
remain the same. In this paper, we examine this interplay 
between creativity and the constraints placed on it by prior 
knowledge by studying people’s generation of novel 
outcomes to conventional event sequences. We often need 
to imagine unconventional or novel outcomes to typical 
happenings (e.g., in launching a new product or assessing 
the impact of new technologies). Yet, we know of little 
work which examines people’s creativity in such situations.  
The idea that creativity is often constrained by prior 
knowledge has been strongly and convincingly argued for in 
Finke et al.’s (1992) Creative Cognition Approach and their 
‘Geneplore model’. This approach has been supported by 
several appropriate empirical demonstrations. For example, 
Ward (1994) asked participants to imagine and then draw 
creatures that live on a distant planet very unlike earth. This 
simple creative task revealed that converse to the 
instructions, almost all the participants produced animals 
very like the ones living on this planet, in that they exhibited 
features such as bilateral symmetry, external organs (e.g. 
eyes, ears) and appendages (e.g. legs, tails). Ward concluded 
that the participants were constrained by their experience of 
real world animals and could not deviate easily from such 
prototypes. This type of influence from background 
knowledge has been subsequently demonstrated in studies 
on the generation of novel product names (Rubin, Stoltzfus 
& Wall, 1991), ideas for traffic improvement (Marsh, 
Landau & Hicks, 1997), and even the generation of non-
words (Marsh, Ward & Landau, 1999). Haught & Johnson-
Laird (2003) have reported similar findings in a task where 
people were asked to come up with a creative sentence 
incorporating two or three specific nouns. They found that 
people were quite restricted in their output; for example, the 
words ‘lion’ ‘strawberry’ and ‘harp’ tended to result in 
similar sentences, such as “The lion was playing the harp 
while eating the strawberry”. In Ward’s (1994) view, these 
“structured imagination” effects occur because, when faced 
with a problem whose solution requires creativity, people 
tend to take the path of least resistance by retrieving domain 
specific information or an existing solution (whether this is 
an experimenter provided example or self-generated from 
previous knowledge) and then attempt to modify the old 
construct in some novel way. 
In the present study, we look at the constraint placed by 
background knowledge in a task that deals with novel 
sentence generation involving script-like scenarios (Bower, 
Black & Turner, 1979; Schank & Abelson, 1977). In our 
task, people are presented with typical event sequences that 
have incomplete, but predictable, endings (see Appendix). 
These scenarios either involve conventional events that 
proceed uninterrupted (e.g. “Matthew had wanted to quit his 
job for months. One day he walked into his boss’s 
office…”), or events that are interrupted by some surprising 
event or state (e.g. “The cup of coffee was balanced on the 
arm of the chair. Suddenly, Richard sneezed….”). In both 
cases, the main manipulation was to ask people to come up 
with a creative outcome to the sequence. In the remainder of 
this paper, we detail this study and sketch the properties of a 
computational model that might capture the effects found. 
Proposing Creative Outcomes to Events 
Following the Creative Cognition Approach, we expected 
that our creative-ending generation task would manifest the 
constraining influence of prior, background knowledge in 
our participants. In the experiment, there were two main 
groups, the Predictable and Creative groups. Both groups 
were given the same set of event sequence materials 
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(divided into Unfolding and Surprise scenarios). However, 
the Predictable group was asked to “think of a typical 
ending to the scenario…”, whereas the Creative group was 
asked to “think of a creative ending to the scenario…”. Thus 
the design was a 2 x 2 one, with Group being a between-
participants variable (Predictable or Creative) and Scenario 
being a within-participants variable (Unfolding or Surprise).  
The main prediction was that the Creative group would 
generate many of the same outcomes as the Predictable 
group, as they would be constrained by their background 
knowledge of the typical endings of these events. However, 
we thought that something additional would also be 
included in these endings, giving them an added novel twist. 
So, in the specific measures we used, we expected more 
elaborate endings in the Creative group (i.e., more 
propositions generated), but we also expected that some of 
these propositions would overlap with those produced by 
the Predictable group (i.e., propositions reflecting a 
common ending). To put it another way, the Predictable 
group’s endings should strongly overlap with those 
generated by the Creative group.  
We had no apriori grounds for expecting a difference 
between the Unfolding and Surprise scenarios, though they 
do appear to be distinct categories. In the Unfolding 
scenarios the sequence of actions proceeds unchecked in a 
predictable way. In the Surprise scenarios one state or 
sequence of actions is cut across by another sequence of 
actions. Interestingly though, in the Surprise scenarios the 
interrupting sequence is also predictable, it’s a “typical 
surprise”  (e.g., a poorly balanced object being knocked).    
Experiment 
Method 
Participants Thirty native English-speaking undergraduate 
psychology students from University College Dublin 
volunteered for this experiment. 
Materials Twenty-four scenarios involving typical 
everyday event sequences (see Appendix). All scenarios had 
two sentences and required a third to complete the sequence. 
The 24 materials consisted of three types of sequences: 8 
Unfolding items, 8 Surprise items and 8 filler items.  The 
Unfolding items described two events/states in a typical 
sequence with a predictable outcome (e.g. “Cathy saw the 
cake in the window. She hadn’t had lunch that day…”). The 
Surprise items described one event/state that was interrupted 
by another event/state leading to a predictable outcome 
(e.g., “The little boy played by the edge of the pond. 
Suddenly he slipped on some moss…”).  
Design In the 2 x 2 (Group x Scenario) design, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two between-participant 
groups, Predictable (N=15) and Creative (N=15). All 
participants received the same 24 scenarios, which were 
presented in a different random order to each participant.  
Procedure Each participant was given a booklet containing 
all the materials, the first page of which included 
instructions. The items were presented so that only one 
scenario appeared on each page (one sentence per line with 
a prompt stating ‘your ending:’ in the space below each 
scenario). Participants in the Predictable group were given 
the instructions to “think of a typical ending to the 
scenario”, whilst those in the Creative group were asked to 
“think of a creative ending” to be written as a concluding 
sentence. In the Creative group participants were also asked 
to describe a “creative turn of events, not just the use of 
creative language” so as to avoid a misinterpretation of the 
instructions. An earlier pilot showed that without this 
instruction, some people just produced purple-prose 
versions of typical endings rather than truly novel endings. 
Scoring Participants’ responses in completing the presented 
sentences were firstly rated for level of creativity. Then the 
responses were analysed into propositions. As a further 
measure of creativity, we wished to examine the diversity 
and richness of responses made, but we also examined the 
commonalities between responses to determine if there was 
any overlap across the different conditions.  
To measure creativity, following Haught & Johnson-
Laird’s (2003) procedure, two judges independently rated 
each sentence (blind to condition) on a 7-point scale, with a 
score of 1 denoting a highly uncreative sentence and a score 
of 7 denoting an extremely creative sentence.  
To measure diversity, for each item we categorised the 
distinct propositions used in people’s endings. So for 
example, for the  “Cathy looked at the cake in the shop 
window. She hadn’t had lunch that day…” item, there were 
three distinct classes of responses given as endings: 
(1) Cathy gets the cake. 
(2) Cathy decides not to get the cake for some reason 
(e.g., diet). 
(3) Cathy was hungry. 
To measure the richness of the responses, we scored the 
endings produced for their word length and the number of 
different events mentioned in them. This measure was used 
because, even though people were asked to provide just one 
sentence, in many cases multiple events/states were 
included in the responses. So for example, in the cake-
seeing scenario, the response “But she knew she was on a 
diet so decided to wait until she got back to her office, and 
then ate something less fattening”, was classed as having 
three events/states:  
(1) Attribute of being on a diet  (a state). 
(2) Cathy went back to office (event 1).  
(3) She ate something less fattening (event 2). 
To measure commonality, we noted the most common 
response, i.e. the frequency of occurrence of a given 
response across a given group. In the cake-seeing scenario 
the most common event was “Cathy gets the cake” which 
received 11 counts in the Predictable group and 9 in the 
Creative group. 
For each of these measures, two raters independently 
scored the materials. The inter-rater reliability was 
uniformly high on each; for example, in the diversity 
measure a random sample of ratings showed 94.99% inter-
rater reliability in categorising the different responses.   
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Table 1: Sample responses from two scenarios 
 
“Katie searched everywhere for her little kitten. 
Then she heard a miaow from the bin”
 
Predictable N  Creative N 
 
Katie opened bin 
 
11 
 
Katie opened bin 4 
An explanation that kitten 
was in bin 
 
3 
An explanation that kitten was 
in bin 
 
4 
Kitten walked out of bin 1 Katie found whole cluster of 
kittens 
 
1 
Katie found wrong kitten 1 
Kitten was being carried away  1 
Katie couldn’t understand how 
kitten was in bin 
 
1 
Bin collector came 1 
Katie was relieved 1 
 
Katie was disappointed 1 
 
“The cup of coffee was balanced on the arm of the chair. 
Suddenly Richard sneezed”
 
Predictable N  Creative N 
 
Cup of coffee fell 
 
13 
 
Cup of coffee fell 7 
Richard saved cup from 
falling 
 
1 
Richard saved cup from  
falling 
 
1 
Richard’s snot went into 
coffee 
 
1 
Richard’s snot went into  
coffee 
 
3 
Chair propelled backwards  1 
Friend got shock and dropped 
her cup of hot chocolate  
 
1 
Spaceship flew out of nose 1 
 
A gust of wind went through 
the window 
 
1 
Results & Discussion 
To summarise, analysis of the results showed that, though 
the Creative group produced more creative, diverse and 
richer responses than the Predictable group, they also could 
not avoid the commonly occurring events that were invited 
by the scenario. These results demonstrate that in generating 
novel outcomes, people are restricted by their background 
knowledge. Table 1 illustrates samples of the responses 
made by participants in two scenarios in the experiment. 
 
Creativity of Responses All of the responses were rated 
blind-to-condition by two judges independently on a 7-point 
scale. The judges’ ratings were reliably correlated 
(Pearson’s r = 0.748, p < 0.01). A 2 x 2 ANOVA on these 
ratings for the Group (between-participants) and Scenario 
(within-participants) variables revealed a main effect of 
Group, Materials and a reliable interaction, F(1,478) = 4.65, 
p < 0.05, MSe = 6.01. As expected, responses from the 
Creative group (M = 3.523) were rated as being more 
creative than those of the Predictable group (M = 2.245), 
F(1,478) = 188.82, p < 0.01, MSe = 397.84. It was also 
found that the Unfolding materials were rated as more 
creative (M = 2.96) than the Surprise materials (M = 2.80), 
F(1, 478) = 4.897, p < 0.05, MSe = 6.338. This finding 
suggests that such unfolding events promote greater creative 
products. This was an unexpected result. It may indicate that 
it is harder to break the inevitability of the outcome to a 
surprise scenario because its outcome is much more highly 
determined. However, we should exercise some care in 
making sweeping conclusions about this difference, as it is 
not reflected in any of the other measures. The reliable 
interaction showed that the most creative condition was the 
Creative-Unfolding one (M = 3.68), followed by the 
Creative-Surprise (M = 3.36), Predictable-Unfolding (M = 
2.24) and Predictable-Surprise (M = 2.23) conditions 
respectively.  
 
Diversity of Responses Overall, one would expect a greater 
diversity of responses in the Creative group versus the 
Predictable group.  This is exactly what we found (see 
Figure 1).  A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the diversity scores revealed 
a reliable main effect of Group, with the Creative group 
generating more classes of responses (M = 6.37) than the 
Predictable group (M = 3.5), F(1, 14) = 34.6, p < 0.01, MSe 
=66.13. There was no reliable effect of Scenario and no 
reliable interaction. An indication of the greater diversity in 
Creative responses can be seen in Table 1 where both 
scenarios show more diversity in the Creative condition.  
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Richness of Responses Another index of creativity is the 
elaborateness or richness of the endings generated. In 
general, one would expect a greater richness in the 
responses made by the Creative group than by the 
Predictable group.  Like Haught & Johnson-Laird (2003) we 
tapped this dimension by examining the average sentence 
length of people’s endings. In addition to this we calculated 
the mean number of different events in each response.  
A 2 x 2 ANOVA again revealed a main effect of Group 
but no other reliable effects. The Creative group was more 
likely to provide longer responses (M = 12.5 words) than the 
Predictable group (M = 9.24 words), F (1, 233) = 35.071, p 
< 0.01, MSe=1220.29. An example of a Predictable response 
for the first scenario in Table 1 was “She reached in and 
pulled the kitten out” (word count = 8), a creative response 
for the same scenario was “She pulled a white kitten from 
the bin, her kitten was black so she put the white kitten back 
and carried on looking” (word count = 23). 
Figure 1:  Diversity - the mean number of different 
responses generated for each condition 
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A 2 x 2 ANOVA on the mean number of different events 
in the ending showed a comparable pattern; a reliable main 
effect of Group, but no other effects. The Creative group 
was more likely to include additional events per ending (M 
= 1.8) than the Predictable group (M = 1.46), F(1,233) = 
19.583, p < 0.01, MSe =13.86. Using the example above, the 
predictable response was classed as having one event and 
the creative was classed as having three events. 
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Commonality of Responses The above measures show the 
generativity of the Creative group at work relative to the 
Predictable one, but they do not reveal the constraints we 
expected from background knowledge based on Ward’s 
(1994) proposals. If this constraint is in evidence we should 
see that, in spite of the clear differences in the creativity of 
responses, there should be certain commonalities between 
the Creative and Predictable groups too. Specifically, we 
should see many of the Creative group using the same, 
inevitable events as some part of their endings. As Figure 2 
illustrates, this is exactly what we found. In an analysis of 
the most commonly produced response, we observed that 
while those in the Predictable condition (M = 10.25) were 
more likely to produce the common event, those in the 
Creative condition (M = 6.313) also produced this same 
event to a high degree, F(1, 14) = 31.042, p < 0.01, 
MSe = 124.03). Again an example of this can be seen in the 
second scenario in Table 1: the most common response for 
all participants is that the “cup of coffee fell”, which 
received high counts in both conditions.  
General Discussion 
The aim of this study was to explore how creative 
instructions would influence an individual’s completion of a 
common event sequence. The Creative Cognition approach 
argues that background knowledge can play a constraining 
role in the creative process, a proposal that is confirmed by 
the present results. More specifically this experiment has 
shown that the expectations we have about certain events in 
the world have a profound influence on our thought 
processes. We found that although responses of the Creative 
group were more creative, rich and diverse than those in the 
Predictable group, certain elements of the endings provided 
by both groups overlapped considerably. Thus, it appears 
that whilst creativity in essence involves some degree of 
variability and unpredictability, it is firmly rooted in our 
background knowledge of events. In the remainder of this 
section, we discuss the relationship of these results to the 
literature on comprehension, and how they might be 
modeled computationally. 
Consistency With Theories of Comprehension 
Graesser Singer & Trabasso (1994) stress that knowledge of 
goals, actions and events are deeply embedded in our 
perceptual and social experience. As we interact with the 
environment, we have a strong tendency to interpret event 
sequences as causal seqeunces, and a similar process occurs 
in comprehension by means of inferences (Kintsch, 1998; 
Zwaan, 1999). For example, Duffy (1986) observed that 
when reading, we continually form expectations about 
future events, so as to develop a causal chain of narrative. 
The ‘Situation Model’ of comprehension holds that we 
construct a detailed mental representation of people, objects, 
locations, events and actions described in a text (e.g. Zwaan, 
1999). Consequently, when reading the scenarios of the 
present experiment, it was difficult for participants to avoid 
making rapid, almost automatic inferences about the mental 
states of the characters and/or the events that would 
typically occur. In the scenario where Cathy sees the cake 
for example, it can easily be inferred that Cathy is hungry 
and that she would like to eat the cake. It could be 
hypothesised that in this task, the participants naturally link 
the two sentences together, and in order to provide a 
coherent ending, they must fit their response with the 
depicted events so that it is easily understandable and 
‘makes sense’ when read. It is this fundamental knowledge 
constraint that often overrides instructions to be creative.  
Possible Computational Models 
Connell & Keane (2002, 2003, in press) have developed a 
computational model of plausibility judgements for event 
sequences that is consistent with the above general theory of 
comprehension. At present, this model takes some event 
description and finds alternative possible inferential paths to 
link the events described, this elaborated representation then 
being scored to assess the plausibility of the description. As 
such, this Plausibility Analysis Model (PAM) is one 
possible candidate model that could be extended to deal 
with the present findings. Such an extension would have to 
rely on two significant changes: (i) the generation of further 
possible events to a given sequence based on background 
knowledge and then (ii) the application of some set of 
selection heuristics to rank order these possible outcomes 
for their novelty. As a first pass, such rules could just favour 
less likely outcomes; that is, outcomes that could possibly 
occur but that are not strongly supported by prior 
experience.  Obviously such an extension would invite new 
predictions about the relationship between plausibility and 
creativity too. 
Figure 2: Commonality – count of most common response 
for each scenario across conditions 
509
  
Concluding Comments 
The present paper reports a novel study of people’s ability 
to generate creative endings to sentences describing 
commonplace event sequences. This work connects several 
areas that have previously been quite separate; namely 
creativity, sentence comprehension and plausibility. The 
convergence of these three areas presents a real opportunity 
for understanding this type of creativity in a new and 
computationally well-specified way.  In short, we should be 
able to characterise the mud of everyday knowledge, exactly 
how it glues us to the ground and, yet, the exact nature of 
the way in which we reach for the stars.   
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Appendix: Materials Used in the Study 
Unfolding Scenarios 
1 Cathy looked at the cake in the shop window. She 
hadn’t had lunch that day. 
2 The dog saw the bone in kitchen bin. He wagged his 
tail in anticipation. 
3 Thomas the cat felt bored. He noticed the dangling 
tablecloth. 
4 Katie searched everywhere for her little kitten. Then 
she heard a miaow from the bin. 
5 James wanted to read the paper. He stopped at the shop 
on his way home from work. 
6 Robert hated his old car. He decided to call the bank. 
7 Matthew had wanted to quit his job for months. One 
day he walked into his boss’s office. 
8 Jim felt very cold. He got some coal and firelighters. 
Surprise Scenarios: 
1 John and Pat were kicking a football on the street. A 
speedy car sharply turned the corner. 
2 Michael’s shopping bags were bursting with groceries. 
He felt one of the handles begin to break. 
3 The cup of coffee was balanced on the arm of the chair. 
Suddenly, Richard sneezed. 
4 The yacht sailed on as the crew slept. A rocky reef lay 
directly ahead. 
5 Paul was crossing a busy road. Unexpectedly his 
mobile phone rang. 
6 Peter and Sally ate lunch in the small restaurant. They 
didn’t realise that the meat wasn’t properly defrosted. 
7 The little boy played at the edge of the pond. Suddenly, 
he slipped on some moss. 
8 The sheep were grazing in the field. Suddenly, a wolf 
approached the flock.  
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